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Abstract. In ISNN’04, a novel symmetric cipher was proposed, by com-
bining a chaotic signal and a clipped neural network (CNN) for en-
cryption. The present paper analyzes the security of this chaotic cipher
against chosen-plaintext attacks, and points out that this cipher can be
broken by a chosen-plaintext attack. Experimental analyses are given to
support the feasibility of the proposed attack.
1 Introduction
Since the 1990s, the study of using chaotic systems to design new ciphers has
become intensive [1]. In particular, the idea of combining chaos and neural net-
works has been developed [2], [3], [4], [5] and has been adopted for image and
video encryption [6], [7]. In our recent work [8], it has been shown that the
chaotic ciphers designed in [2], [3], [4], [6], [7] are not sufficiently secure from a
cryptographical point of view.
This paper focuses on the security of a clipped-neural-network-based chaotic
cipher proposed in ISNN’04 [5]. This chaotic cipher employs a chaotic pseudo-
random signal and the output of a 8-cell clipped neural network to mask the
plaintext, along with modulus additions and XOR operations. Also, the evolu-
tion of the neural network is controlled by the chaotic signal. With such a com-
plicated combination, it was hoped that the chaotic cipher can resist chosen-
plaintext attacks. Unfortunately, our analysis shows that it is still not secure
against chosen-plaintext attacks. By choosing only two plaintexts, an attacker
can derive an equivalent key to break the cipher. This paper reports our analyses
and simulation results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a brief introduc-
tion to the chaotic cipher under study. The proposed chosen-plaintext attack is
described in detail in Sec. 3, with some experimental results. The last section
concludes the paper.
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2 The CNN-Based Chaotic Cipher
First, the CNN employed in the chaotic cipher is introduced. The neural network
contains 8 neural cells, denoted by S0, · · · , S7 ∈ {1,−1}, and each cell is con-
nected with other cells via eight synaptic weights wij ∈ {1, 0,−1}, among which
only three are non-zeros. The synaptic weights between two connected cells are
identical: ∀ i, j = 0 ∼ 7, wij = wji. The neural network evolves according to the
following rule: ∀ i = 0 ∼ 7,
f(Si) = sign
(
S˜i
)
=
{
1, S˜i > 0 ,
−1, S˜i < 0 ,
(1)
where S˜i =
∑7
j=0 wijSj . Note that S˜i 6= 0 holds at all times.
Now, let us see how the chaotic cipher works with the above CNN. With-
out loss of generality, assume that f = {f(i)}N−1i=0 is the plaintext signal, where
f(i) denotes the i-th plain-byte and N is the plaintext size in byte. Accordingly,
denote the ciphertext by f ′ = {f ′(i)}N−1i=0 , where f ′(i) is a double-precision
floating-point number corresponding to the plain-byte f(i). The encryption pro-
cedure can be briefly depicted as follows1.
– The secret key includes the initial states of the 8 neural cells in the CNN,
S0(0), · · · , S7(0), the initial condition x(0), and the control parameter r of
the following chaotic tent map:
T (x) =
{
rx, 0 < x ≤ 0.5 ,
r(1− x), 0.5 < x < 1 , (2)
where r should be very close to 2 to ensure the chaoticity of the tent map.
– The initial procedure: 1) in double-precision floating-point arithmetic, run
the tent map from x(0) for 128 times before the encryption starts; 2) run
the CNN for 128/8 = 16 times (under the control of the tent map, as dis-
cussed below in the last step of the encryption procedure); 3) set x(0) and
S0(0), · · · , S7(0) to be the new states of the tent map and the CNN.
– The encryption procedure: for the i-th plain-byte f(i), perform the following
steps to get the ciphertext f ′(i):
• evolve the CNN for one step to get its new states: S0(i), · · · , S7(i);
• in double-precision floating-point arithmetic, run the chaotic tent map
for 8 times to get 8 chaotic states: x(8i+ 0), · · · , x(8i+ 7);
• generate 8 bits by extracting the 4-th bits of the 8 chaotic states: b(8i+
0), · · · , b(8i+ 7), and then ∀ j = 0 ∼ 7, set Ej = 2 · b(8i+ j)− 1;
• encrypt f(i) as follows2:
f ′(i) =
((
f(i)⊕B(i)
256
+ x(8i+ 7)
)
mod 1
)
, (3)
1 Note that some original notations used in [5] have been changed in order to provide
a better description.
2 In [5], x(8i+ 7) was mistaken as x(8).
where B(i) =
∑7
j=0
(
Sj(i)+1
2
)
· 27−j ;
• ∀ i = 0 ∼ 7, if Si 6= Ei, update all the three non-zero weights of the
i-th neural cell and the three mirror weights as follows: wij = −wij ,
wji = −wji.
– The decryption procedure is similar to the above one with the following de-
cryption formula:
f(i) = (256 · ((f ′(i)− x(8i+ 7)) mod 1))⊕B(i) . (4)
3 The Chosen-Plaintext Attack
In chosen-plaintext attacks, it is assumed that the attacker can intentionally
choose a number of plaintexts to try to break the secret key or its equivalent
[9]. Although it was claimed that the chaotic cipher under study can resist this
kind of attacks [5, Sec. 4], our cryptanalysis shows that such a claim is not true.
By choosing two plaintexts, f1 and f2, satisfying ∀ i = 0 ∼ N − 1, f1(i) = f2(i),
one can derive two masking sequences as equivalent keys for decryption.
Before introducing the chosen-plaintext attack, three lemmas are given, which
are useful in the following discussions.
Lemma 1. ∀ a, b, c ∈ R, c 6= 0 and n ∈ Z+, if a = (b mod c), one has a · n =
((b · n) mod (c · n)).
Proof. From a = (b mod c), one knows that ∃ k ∈ Z, b = c ·k+a and 0 ≤ a < c.
Thus, ∀ n ∈ Z+, b · n = c · n · k + a · n and 0 ≤ a · n < c · n, which immediately
leads to a · n = ((b · n) mod (c · n)) and completes the proof of this lemma. uunionsq
Lemma 2. ∀ a, b, c, n ∈ R and 0 ≤ a, b < n, if c = ((a − b) mod n), one has
a− b ∈ {c, c− n}.
Proof. This lemma can be proved under two conditions. i) When a ≥ b, it is
obvious that ((a − b) mod n) = a − b = c. ii) When a < b, ((a − b) mod n) =
((n + a − b) mod n). Since −n < a − b < 0, one has 0 < n + a − b < n, which
means that ((a− b) mod n) = n+ a− b = c. That is, a− b = c− n. Combining
the two conditions, this lemma is thus proved. uunionsq
Lemma 3. Assume that a, b are both 8-bit integers. If a = b ⊕ 128, then a ≡
(b+ 128) (mod 256).
Proof. This lemma can be proved under two conditions. i) When 0 ≤ a < 128:
b = a ⊕ 128 = a + 128, so a ≡ (b + 128) (mod 256). ii) When 128 ≤ a ≤ 255:
b = a⊕ 128 = a− 128, so a ≡ (b− 128) ≡ (b+ 128) (mod 256). uunionsq
From Lemma 1, one can rewrite the encryption formula Eq. (3) as follows:
256 · f ′(i) = (((f(i)⊕B(i)) + 256 · x(8i+ 7)) mod 256) . (5)
Given two plain-bytes f1(i) 6= f2(i) and the corresponding cipher-blocks f ′1(i), f ′2(i),
one has 256·(f ′1(i)−f ′2(i)) ≡ ((f1(i)⊕B(i))− (f2(i)⊕B(i))) (mod 256). With-
out loss of generality, assume that f ′1(i) > f
′
2(i) and that ∆f1,2 = 256 · (f ′1(i) −
f ′2(i)). It is true that 0 < ∆f1,2 < 256. Thus, one has
∆f1,2 = (((f1(i)⊕B(i))− (f2(i)⊕B(i))) mod 256) . (6)
Because f1(i) ⊕ B(i) and f2(i) ⊕ B(i) are 8-bit integers and ∆f1,2 6= 0, from
Lemma 2, one of the following facts is true:
1. (f1(i)⊕B(i))− (f2(i)⊕B(i)) = ∆f1,2 ∈ {1, · · · , 255} ; (7a)
2. (f2(i)⊕B(i))− (f1(i)⊕B(i)) =
(
256−∆f1,2
) ∈ {1, · · · , 255} . (7b)
For the above two equations, when f1(i) = f2(i) is satisfied, two possible values
of B(i) can be uniquely derived according to the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Assume that a, b, c, x are all 8-bit integers, and c > 0. If a =
b¯, then the equation (a ⊕ x) − (b ⊕ x) = c has an unique solution x = a ⊕
(1, c7, · · · , c1)2, where c = (c7, · · · , c0)2 =
∑7
i=0 ci · 2i.
Proof. Since a = b¯, one has b⊕ x = a⊕ x. Thus, by substituting y = a⊕ x and
y¯ = a⊕ x = b ⊕ x into (a ⊕ x) − (b ⊕ x) = c, one can get y − y¯ = c, which is
equivalent to y = y¯ + c. Let y =
∑7
i=0 yi · 2i, and consider the following three
conditions, respectively.
1) When i = 0, from y0 ≡ (y¯0+c0) (mod 2), one can immediately get c0 = 1.
Note the following two facts: i) when y0 = 0, y¯0+c0 = 2, a carry bit is generated
for the next bit, so y1 ≡ (y¯1 + c1 + 1) (mod 2) and c1 = 0; ii) when y0 = 1,
y0 + c0 = 1, no carry bit is generated, so y1 ≡ (y¯1 + c1) (mod 2) and c1 = 1.
Apparently, it is always true that y0 = c1. Also, a carry bit is generated if c1 = 0
is observed.
2) When i = 1, if there exists a carry bit, set c′1 = c1 +1 ∈ {1, 2}; otherwise,
set c′1 = c1 ∈ {0, 1}. From y1 ≡ (y¯1 + c′1) (mod 2), one can immediately get
c′1 = 1. Then, using the same method shown in the first condition, one has
y1 = c2 and knows whether or not a carry bit is generated for i = 2. Repeat the
above procedure for i = 2 ∼ 6, one can uniquely determine that yi = ci+1.
3) When i = 7, it is always true that the carry bit does not occur, so c′7 = 1,
and y7 ≡ 1.
Combining the above three conditions, one can get y = (1, c7, · · · , c1)2, which
results in x = a⊕ (1, c7, · · · , c1)2. uunionsq
Assume that the two values of B(i) derived from Eqs. (7a) and (7b) are B1(i)
and B2(i), respectively. The following corollary shows that the two values have
a deterministic relation: B2(i) = B1(i)⊕ 128.
Corollary 1. Assume that a, b, c, x are all 8-bit integers, a = b¯ and c > 0. Given
two equations, (a⊕ x)− (b⊕ x) = c and (b⊕ x′)− (a⊕ x′) = c′, if c′ = 256− c,
then x′ = x⊕ 128.
Proof. Since c+ c¯ = 255, one has c′ = 256− c = c¯+ 1. Let c =∑7i=0 ci · 2i, and
observe the first condition of the proof of Theorem 1. One can see that c0 = 1,
so c′0 = c¯0 + 1 = 1. Since there is no carry bit, one can deduce that ∀ i = 1 ∼ 7,
c′i = c¯i. Applying Theorem 1 for (a ⊕ x) − (b ⊕ x) = c, one can uniquely get
x = a⊕(1, c7, · · · , c1)2. Then, applying Theorem 1 for (b⊕x′)−(a⊕x′) = c′, one
has x′ = b⊕ (1, c′7, · · · , c′1)2 = a¯⊕ (1, c¯7, · · · , c¯1)2 = (a7, a¯6 ⊕ c¯7, · · · , a¯0 ⊕ c¯1)2 =
(a7, a6 ⊕ c7, · · · , a0 ⊕ c1)2 = a⊕ (1, c7, · · · , c1)2 ⊕ (1, 0, · · · , 0)2 = x⊕ 128. Thus,
this corollary is proved. uunionsq
For any one of the two candidate values of B(i), one can further get an
equivalent chaotic state xˆ(8i+ 7) from B(i), f(i) and f ′(i) as follows:
xˆ(8i+ 7) = 256 · f ′(i)− (f(i)⊕B(i)) ≡ 256 · x(8i+ 7) (mod 256) . (8)
With B(i) and xˆ(8i+ 7), the encryption formula Eq. (3) becomes
f ′(i) =
((f(i)⊕B(i)) + xˆ(8i+ 7)) mod 256
256
, (9)
and the decryption formula Eq. (4) becomes
f(i) = ((256 · f ′(i)− xˆ(8i+ 7)) mod 256)⊕B(i) . (10)
Assume that xˆ1(8i+ 7) and xˆ2(8i+ 7) are calculated by Eq. (8), from B1(i)
and B2(i), respectively. Then, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (B1(i), xˆ1(8i+ 7)) and (B2(i), xˆ2(8i+ 7)) are equivalent for the
above encryption procedure Eq. (9), though only one corresponds to the correct
value generated from the secret key. That is,
((f(i)⊕B1(i)) + xˆ1(8i+ 7)) ≡ ((f(i)⊕B2(i)) + xˆ2(8i+ 7)) (mod 256) .
Proof. From B1(i) = B2(i) ⊕ 128, one has f(i) ⊕ B1(i) = (f(i) ⊕ B2(i) ⊕ 128).
Then, following Lemma 3, it is true that (f(i) ⊕ B1(i)) ≡ ((f(i) ⊕ B2(i)) +
128) (mod 256). As a result, xˆ1(8i + 7) = (256 · f ′(i) − (f(i) ⊕ B1(i))) ≡
(256 · f ′(i)− ((f(i)⊕B2(i))− 128)) (mod 256) ≡ (xˆ2(8i+7)+ 128) (mod 256),
which immediately leads to the following fact: ((f(i)⊕B1(i)) + xˆ1(8i+ 7)) ≡
((f(i)⊕B2(i)) + xˆ2(8i+ 7)) (mod 256). Thus, this proposition is proved. uunionsq
Considering the symmetry of the encryption and decryption procedures, the
above proposition immediately leads to a conclusion that (B1(i), xˆ1(8i+ 7)) and
(B2(i), xˆ2(8i+ 7)) are also equivalent for the decryption procedure Eq. (10).
From the above analyses, with two chosen plaintexts f1 and f2 = f¯1, one
can get the following two sequences: {B1(i), xˆ1(8i+ 7)}N−1i=0 and {B2(i), xˆ2(8i+
7)}N−1i=0 . Given a ciphertext f ′ = {f ′(i)}N−1i=0 , ∀ i = 0 ∼ N−1, one can use either
(B1(i), xˆ1(8i + 7)) or (B2(i), xˆ2(8i + 7)) as an equivalent of the secret key to
decrypt the i-th plain-byte f(i), following Eq. (10). This means that the chaotic
cipher under study is not sufficiently secure against the chosen-plaintext attack.
To demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed attack, some experiments have
been performed for image encryption, with secret key r = 1.99, x(0) = 0.41
and [S0(0), · · · , S7(0)] = [1,−1, 1,−1, 1,−1, 1,−1]. One plain-image “Lenna” of
size 256 × 256 is chosen as f1 and another plain-image is manually generated
as follows: f2 = f¯1. The two plain-images and their cipher-images are shown
in Fig. 1. With the two chosen plain-images, two sequences, {B1(i), xˆ1(8i +
7)}256×256−1i=0 and {B2(i), xˆ2(8i+7)}256×256−1i=0 , are generated by using the above-
mentioned algorithm. The first ten elements of the two sequences are given in
Table 1. ∀ i = 0 ∼ (256×256−1), either (B1(i), xˆ1(8i+7)) or (B2(i), xˆ2(8i+7))
can be used to recover the plain-byte f(i). As a result, the whole plain-image
(“Peppers” in this test) can be recovered as shown in Fig. 1f.
Table 1. The first ten elements of {B1(i), xˆ1(8i + 7)}256×256−1i=0 and {B2(i), xˆ2(8i +
7)}256×256−1i=0
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
B1(i) 146 231 54 202 59 243 166 173 233 82
B2(i) 18 103 182 74 187 115 38 45 105 210
xˆ1(8i+ 7) 242.40 38.63 242.62 222.09 81.03 214.73 240.91 203.59 138.20 9.33
xˆ2(8i+ 7) 114.40 166.63 114.62 94.09 209.03 86.73 112.91 75.59 10.20 137.33
a) Chosen plain-image f1 c) Chosen plain-image f2 e) A cipher-image f
′
3
b) Cipher-image f ′1 d) Cipher-image f
′
2 f) Recovered image f3
Fig. 1. The proposed chosen-plaintext attack
4 Conclusion
In this paper, the security of a chaotic cipher based on clipped neural network
has been analyzed in detail. It is found that the scheme can be effectively broken
with only two chosen plain-images. Both theoretical and experimental analyses
have been given to support the proposed attack. Therefore, this scheme is not
suggested for applications that requires a high level of security.
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